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DUE DILIGENCE STANDARD FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS PURSUANT TO CPLR 308 (4) WAS MET (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should not have dismissed the complaint in this foreclosure action on the ground that efforts to serve the defendant were inadequate pursuant to CPLR 308 (4). The Second Department found the efforts to serve defendant met the due diligence standard:

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Here, the affidavit of the process server demonstrated that three visits were made to the homeowner’s residence, each on different days and at different times of the day. The process server also described in detail his unsuccessful attempt to obtain an employment address for the homeowner, including interviewing a neighbor. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court improperly concluded that the due diligence requirement was not satisfied  … . U.S. Bank, N.A. v Cepeda, 2017 NY Slip Op 07767, Second Dept 11-8-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (DUE DILIGENCE STANDARD FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS PURSUANT TO CPLR 308 (4) WAS MET (SECOND DEPT))/SERVICE OF PROCESS  (DUE DILIGENCE STANDARD FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS PURSUANT TO CPLR 308 (4) WAS MET (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 308 (4)  (DUE DILIGENCE STANDARD FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS PURSUANT TO CPLR 308 (4) WAS MET (SECOND DEPT))/DUE DILIGENCE (SERVICE OF PROCESS,  DUE DILIGENCE STANDARD FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS PURSUANT TO CPLR 308 (4) WAS MET (SECOND DEPT))

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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE WHICH ARISES FROM THE ACTION BROUGHT IS NOT TIME-BARRED... SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERING A RENEWAL JUDGMENT PROPERLY GRANTED, CRITERIA EXPLAINED...