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Property Owner’s Liability for Snow and Ice on Sidewalk​

In reversing the grant of summary judgment to the defendant in a slip and fall case, the Second Department explained the controlling law with respect to ice and snow on a municipal sidewalk abutting private property as follows:

Section 7-210 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York, which became effective September 14, 2003, shifted tort liability from the City to the property owner for personal injuries proximately caused by the owner’s failure to maintain the sidewalk abutting its premises in a reasonably safe condition (including the negligent failure to remove snow, ice, or other material from the sidewalk), with several exceptions not relevant here … .

Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-210 does not impose strict liability upon the property owner, and the injured party has the obligation to prove the elements of negligence to demonstrate that an owner is liable …. Thus, in support of a motion for summary judgment dismissing a cause of action pursuant to Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-210, the property owner has the initial burden of demonstrating, prima facie, that it neither created the hazardous condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence for a sufficient length of time to discover and remedy it …. Gyokchyan v City of New York, 2013 NY Slip Op 03302, 2nd Dept, 5-8-13

 

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