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Action for Fraud Cannot Be Based on Same Facts as Breach of Contract; Fraud Must Be Pled in Detail

After noting that a cause of action for fraud does not lie when it is based on the same allegations stated in a breach of contract cause of action, the Second Department explained the pleading requirements in a fraud action, including the need for “detail,” as follows:

A cause of action to recover damages for fraud requires allegations of (1) a false representation of fact, (2) knowledge of the falsity, (3) intent to induce reliance, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) damages…. Moreover, CPLR 3016(b) requires that the circumstances underlying a cause of action based on fraud be stated “in detail” (CPLR 3016[b];…). Here, the allegations of fraud against the remaining defendants either were bare and conclusory or do not rise to the level of fraud. Consequently, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the separate motions of the remaining defendants which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the third cause of action insofar as asserted against each of them. Genovese v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 2013 NY Slip Op 03453, 2nd Dept, 5-15-13

 

 

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