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SENTENCING JUDGE INDICATED HE WAS BOUND BY AN AGREEMENT WITH THE PEOPLE CONCERNING DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE, HOWEVER, A SENTENCING JUDGE HAS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING, MATTER REMITTED FOR RESENTENCING (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, vacating defendant's sentence, determined it appeared the sentencing judge mistakenly believed he was bound by his agreement with the People to impose a particular sentence:

County Court initially imposed a one-year term of interim probation. The court informed defendant that, if he complied with the terms of interim probation, the court would impose a five-year term of probation. Defendant, however, repeatedly violated those terms. At sentencing, the court stated that “the only way” it could secure defendant a plea bargain involving probation was to help negotiate a plea agreement with “specific terms,” including a “severe sanction” in the event that he violated the terms of interim probation. The court then stated that it had to “keep [its] word,” presumably to the People, because otherwise it would be unable to secure the “same opportunity for another defendant who is in a similar situation.” The court further stated that it was “compelled” to impose an indeterminate term of incarceration of 2⅓ to 7 years, which is the maximum legal sentence (see Penal Law § 70.00 [2] [d]; [3] [b]).

Defendant contends that the court failed to exercise its discretion at sentencing. We agree. “[T]he sentencing decision is a matter committed to the exercise of the court's discretion . . . made only after careful consideration of all facts available at the time of sentencing”… . “The determination of an appropriate sentence requires the exercise of discretion after due consideration given to, among other things, the crime charged, the particular circumstances of the individual before the court and the purpose of a penal sanction, i.e., societal protection, rehabilitation and deterrence” … . Here, the court indicated that it was bound by its agreement with the People to impose a particular sentence … . People v Dupont, 2018 NY Slip Op 06392, Fourth Dept 9-28-18

CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCING JUDGE INDICATED HE WAS BOUND BY AN AGREEMENT WITH THE PEOPLE CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE, HOWEVER, A SENTENCING JUDGE HAS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING, MATTER REMITTED FOR RESENTENCING (FOURTH DEPT))/JUDGES (CRIMINAL LAW, SENTENCING JUDGE INDICATED HE WAS BOUND BY AN AGREEMENT WITH THE PEOPLE CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE, HOWEVER, A SENTENCING JUDGE HAS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING, MATTER REMITTED FOR RESENTENCING (FOURTH DEPT))/SENTENCING (CRIMINAL LAW, SENTENCING JUDGE INDICATED HE WAS BOUND BY AN AGREEMENT WITH THE PEOPLE CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE, HOWEVER, A SENTENCING JUDGE HAS DISCRETION IN SENTENCING, MATTER REMITTED FOR RESENTENCING (FOURTH DEPT))

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