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IN THE ABSENCE OF A MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT BY THE DEFENDANTS, THE JUDGE DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DISMISS THE ACTION ON THE EVE OF TRIAL “IN THE INTEREST OF JUDICIAL ECONOMY” BASED UPON PERCEIVED EVIDENTIARY DEFICIENCIES (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint on the eve of trial, in the interest of judicial economy, based on an evidentiary issue. Absent a motion by the defendants, the judge lacked the power to dismiss the action:

… [I]t is undisputed that there was no motion by defendants requesting dismissal of the complaint. Rather, defendants opposed the request by plaintiff that he be permitted to admit in evidence at trial certain medical records. Inasmuch as there was no motion for dismissal pending before the court—either on the basis that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law or based on plaintiff’s admissions—the court lacked authority to dismiss the complaint in the interest of judicial economy … . Indeed, by sua sponte dismissing the complaint before plaintiff presented any evidence, the court deprived plaintiff of an opportunity to oppose dismissal and deprived defendants of an opportunity to state the grounds that supported dismissal (see generally CPLR 4401). Additionally, we can find no legal authority (nor do the parties identify any), that permits a court to, on its own volition, dismiss a complaint on the eve of trial without any request for such relief—absent extraordinary circumstances not present here … . Although the court determined that plaintiff cannot substantiate his claims, the court nevertheless erred in dismissing the complaint on that basis moments before trial was to commence without any request for such relief from defendants. Wallace v Kinney, 2025 NY Slip Op 03879, Fourth Dept 6-27-25

Practice Point: On the eve of trial, absent a motion to dismiss by the defendant, a trial judge generally does not have the authority to dismiss complaint “in the interest of judicial economy” based on perceived evidentiary deficiencies.

 

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