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SUPREME COURT LACKED TO POWER TO SUPPRESS DEFENDANT’S PRESENTENCE REPORT IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant juvenile offender could not move to suppress his presentence report in subsequent Department of Homeland Security proceedings:

The defendant, an immigrant from Bangladesh, was adjudicated a youthful offender. After completing his sentence, the defendant was detained by the United States Department of Homeland Security (hereinafter the DHS), which, in reliance on the defendant's presentence report, argued that the defendant should be denied a bond due to his youthful offender adjudication. Thereafter, the defendant moved before the Supreme Court in the subject criminal proceeding pursuant to CPLR 3103 for a protective order “enjoining the [DHS's] use” of his presentence report, arguing that it is a confidential record under CPL 720.35(2), which the DHS had improperly obtained. In an order dated June 6, 2017, the Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion. The defendant appeals.

CPLR 3103 ” confers broad discretion upon a court to fashion appropriate remedies' to prevent the abuse of disclosure devices” … . Pursuant to CPLR 3103(c), “[i]f any disclosure under this article has been improperly or irregularly obtained so that a substantial right of a party is prejudiced, the court, on motion, may make an appropriate order, including an order that the information be suppressed” … . Here, since the DHS did not obtain the presentence report in the course of any disclosure process under CPLR Article 31, there is no basis for the issuance of a protective order pursuant to CPLR 3103(c). Moreover, since “[c]ontrol over immigration and naturalization is entrusted exclusively to the Federal Government, and a State has no power to interfere” … , the Supreme Court lacked the power to suppress the presentence report in immigration proceedings. People v Saqline K., 2018 NY Slip Op 06115, Second Dept 9-19-18

CRIMINAL LAW (SUPREME COURT LACKED TO POWER TO SUPPRESS DEFENDANT'S PRESENTENCE REPORT IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS (SECOND DEPT))/IMMIGRATION LAW (SUPREME COURT LACKED TO POWER TO SUPPRESS DEFENDANT'S PRESENTENCE REPORT IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (IMMIGRATION LAW, SUPREME COURT LACKED TO POWER TO SUPPRESS DEFENDANT'S PRESENTENCE REPORT IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS (SECOND DEPT))CIVIL PROCEDURE (IMMIGRATION LAW, (SUPREME COURT LACKED TO POWER TO SUPPRESS DEFENDANT'S PRESENTENCE REPORT IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS (SECOND DEPT))PRESENTENCE REPORT (IMMIGRATION LAW, SUPREME COURT LACKED TO POWER TO SUPPRESS DEFENDANT'S PRESENTENCE REPORT IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS (SECOND DEPT))

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