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ALLOCUTION CAST DOUBT ABOUT GUILT IN THIS JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING, AN EXCEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT FOR APPEAL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined that the plea allocution was defective in this juvenile delinquency proceeding. The allocution did not support the elements of the charged offense (grand larceny fourth degree if committed by an adult) and the juvenile’s foster care planner was not questioned about the offense, a defect which cannot be waived. Although no motion to withdraw was made, the allocution cast significant doubt about guilt which constitutes an exception to the the preservation requirement for appeal:

The appellant did not move to withdraw his admission on the grounds raised on appeal … . However, this is one of the ” rare case[s] . . . where the [appellant’s] recitation of the facts underlying the crime pleaded to clearly casts significant doubt upon the [appellant’s] guilt,’ [which] fall[s] into the narrow exception to the preservation requirement”… . In addition, the appellant was not required to preserve his contention that the Family Court erred in failing to obtain an allocution from the foster care case planner, since the statutory requirement of such an allocution may not be waived … . * * *

The Family Court did not elicit any additional details concerning the incident in order to clarify how the appellant came to be in possession of the $5 such that it could be concluded that he took it from the boy’s person within the meaning of Penal Law § 155.30(5). Thus, the court “did not elicit a sufficient factual basis to support [the appellant’s] admission'” … .

In addition, the appellant’s admission was defective since his foster care case planner was present, but the Family Court failed to ascertain through allocution of the foster care case planner, as a person legally responsible for the appellant’s care, “that (a) [the appellant] committed the act or acts to which he [was] entering an admission, (b) he [was] voluntarily waiving his right to a fact-finding hearing, and (c) he [was] aware of the possible specific dispositional orders” … . Matter of Richard S., 2019 NY Slip Op 00130, Second Dept 1-9-19

 

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