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IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 ACTION, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS AN OWNER OF THE PROPERTY WHERE PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY A FALLING OBJECT, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact whether defendant 101 Norfolk was an owner within the meaning of Labor Law 240(1), 241(6) and 200. Plaintiff was injured by a falling object:

Contrary to the defendant 101 Norfolk's contention, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the defendant 101 Norfolk was not an “owner” for purposes of liability under the Labor Law. Rather, the evidence demonstrated that the defendant 101 Norfolk owned the property on which the plaintiff allegedly was injured and there was evidence that the plaintiff was injured in the course of a construction project encompassing both 103-105 Norfolk Street and the defendant 101 Norfolk's property, 101 Norfolk Street. Under the circumstances of this case, triable issues of fact exist as to whether the defendant 101 Norfolk contracted to have the injury-causing work performed, or had a sufficient nexus to that work, so as to support liability under Labor Law §§ 240 and 241 … . There are also triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant 101 Norfolk had a duty to provide the plaintiff with a safe place to work … . Powell v Norfolk Hudson, LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 06047, Second Dept 9-12-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (IN THIS LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 ACTION, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS AN OWNER OF THE PROPERTY WHERE PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED BY A FALLING OBJECT, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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