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FAILURE TO WARN WAS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE OF THE INJURIES AND DEATHS IN THIS PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the manufacturer of a transformer base was entitled to summary judgment in this failure to warn action. Plaintiffs decedent fell asleep at the wheel, “drove up an embankment, struck a tree, rolled back down the embankment, and ran over a transformer base, which ruptured the gas tank of his vehicle, causing a fire. The decedent was unable to extricate himself and his two infant children from the vehicle, and they all died. “

The plaintiff alleged that when a pole is attached to the transformer base, the transformer base is designed so that it will break away from its concrete base when it is struck by a vehicle in order to minimize damage to the vehicle. The plaintiff alleged that when the pole was removed from the subject transformer base prior to the accident, the transformer base lost this “breakaway” feature. The plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer of the transformer base and all other entities in the supply chain had a duty to warn the DOT that the transformer base would lose its breakaway capability if it was not attached to a pole. * * *

To recover on a strict products liability cause of action based on inadequate warnings, a plaintiff must prove causation, i.e., that if adequate warnings had been provided, the product would not have been misused… . In other words, “[f]or there to be recovery for damages stemming from a product defective because of the inadequacy or absence of warnings, the failure to warn must have been a substantial cause of the events which produced the injury” … . “Generally, it is for the trier of fact to determine the issue of proximate cause”… . “However, the issue of proximate cause may be decided as a matter of law where only one conclusion may be drawn from the established facts” … . …

The transformer base at issue in this case was located beyond the clear zone, which is defined as “an area without fixed objects that is adjacent to a highway and intended to provide safe passage and a recovery area for vehicles that veer off the roadway” … . [Defendants] demonstrated that, as per DOT policy, light poles located beyond the clear zone were not required to have breakaway transformer bases and that the loss of the breakaway feature would not have affected the DOT's decision to remove the light pole from the subject transformer base prior to the accident. Accordingly, [defendants] established, prima facie, that the failure to warn of the loss of the breakaway feature was not a substantial cause of the events which produced the injuries alleged here … . Reece v J.D. Posillico, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 06048, Second Dept 9-12-18

PRODUCTS LIABILITY (FAILURE TO WARN WAS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE OF THE INJURIES AND DEATHS IN THIS PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/FAILURE TO WARN (PRODUCTS LIABILITY, FAILURE TO WARN WAS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE OF THE INJURIES AND DEATHS IN THIS PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/WARN, FAILURE TO (PRODUCTS LIABILITY, FAILURE TO WARN WAS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE OF THE INJURIES AND DEATHS IN THIS PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (PRODUCTS LIABILITY, FAILURE TO WARN WAS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE OF THE INJURIES AND DEATHS IN THIS PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/HIGHWAYS AND ROADS  (PRODUCTS LIABILITY, FAILURE TO WARN WAS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE OF THE INJURIES AND DEATHS IN THIS PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION, DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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