You are here: / / Under Mental Hygiene Law, Claim Made for Payment from Nursing Home Resident’s...
, , ,

Under Mental Hygiene Law, Claim Made for Payment from Nursing Home Resident’s Guardianship Account During Resident’s Life Had Priority over Claim by Department of Social Services After Resident’s Death

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Acosta, over a dissent, determined that a nursing home (Eastchester) which had submitted a claim for the resident’s (Shannon’s) care to the resident’s guardianship account during the resident’s life had priority over the Department of Social Services, which submitted a claim for the resident’s care (Medicaid) to the resident’s estate after death:

Eastchester, a skilled nursing facility, admitted Edna Shannon into its care in 2005. In 2008, due to Shannon’s need for assistance, and concerns about the proper handling of her finances by third parties, Eastchester commenced a proceeding pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 81 to have a guardian appointed for her person and property. It also filed an application for medical assistance for Shannon’s nursing home costs. In 2009, DSS determined that Shannon was eligible for Medicaid, effective September 1, 2008. By order and judgment entered April 24, 2009, Supreme Court appointed Family Service Society of Yonkers as her guardian. Among other things, the court conferred on Family Service Society the authority to pay Shannon’s nursing home expenses and to pay bills after her death. Shannon died in December 2011 at age 87. * * *

As Eastchester was to be paid out of the guardianship account before any funds passed to the estate, its claim had priority over DSS’s claim.  MHL § 81.44(d) provides that, within 150 days of the death of an incapacitated person, the guardian must serve on the personal representative of the decedent’s estate, or if none, the public administrator or chief fiscal officer, a statement of assets and notice of claim, and “except for property retained to secure any known claim, lien or administrative costs of the guardianship,” deliver all guardianship property to the personal representative, public administrator, or chief fiscal officer (emphasis added). Matter of Shannon, 2014 NY Slip Op 04452, 1st Dept 6-17-14

 

You might also like
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION BY GUILTY PLEA ON INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE GROUNDS WAS PROPERLY DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING; THE TWO DISSENTERS ARGUED THE PRO SE MOTION WAS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT A HEARING, DESPITE THE TECHNICAL DEFECTS (FOURTH DEPT).
THE REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, WHOSE MEMBERS OWN HOTELS, HAD STANDING TO CONTEST A LOCAL LAW PLACING A TWO-YEAR MORATORIUM ON THE CONVERSION OF HOTELS TO RESIDENTIAL UNITS, THE BOARD DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE LAW UNDER THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE IT DID NOT ALLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND DID NOT ALLEGE HARM SEPARATE AND APART FROM INJURY TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC (FIRST DEPT).
RE: DETERMINING THE CORRECT JURISDICTION FOR STATUTE-OF-LIMITATIONS PURPOSES, THE ACCRUAL OF A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION ALLEGING PURELY ECONOMIC INJURY IS USUALLY IN THE “PLACE OF INJURY,” WHICH IS USUALLY WHERE THE PLAINTIFF RESIDES (FIRST DEPT).
PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, A CABLE TRAY FELL ON HIS HEAD FROM THE TOP OF TWO LADDERS, A SUBCONTRACTOR WAS LIABLE BECAUSE THE CONTRACT DELEGATED THE AUTHORITY TO CONTROL THE WORK TO THE SUBCONTRACTOR, THE LESSEE WAS LIABLE AS AN “OWNER” WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1) (FIRST DEPT).
THE LLC’S FAILURE TO CHANGE THE ADDRESS ON FILE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE IS NOT A SUFFICIENT EXCUSE FOR A DEFAULT; PARTIES TO WHICH THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS TRANSFERRED AFTER THE LIS PENDENS WAS FILED ARE NOT NECESSARY PARTIES BECAUSE THEY ARE BOUND BY THE RESULT IN THIS ACTION (FIRST DEPT). ​
PLAINTIFF’S DEPOSITION TESTIMONY DEEMED INCREDIBLE AS A MATTER OF LAW IN THIS TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
TESTIMONY AT THE FACT FINDING HEARING ABOUT THE IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED BECAUSE IT DIFFERED SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE PROCEDURE DESCRIBED IN THE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE FORM.
DESPITE THE INITIAL FRAUDULENT TRANSFER OF THE MORTGAGED PROPERTY AND THE ABSENCE OF THE NOTE, PLAINTIFF LENDER COULD FORECLOSE AS THE UNDISPUTED HOLDER OF THE NOTE, THE INITIAL FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED DEED WAS VOIDABLE, NOT VOID (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Delay In Arrival of an Ambulance During a Snow Storm Not Actionable Petitioner Did Not Demonstrate Need for Involuntary Assisted Outpatient Treatment/Case...