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Criteria for “Substantial Evidence” Review of an Administrative Determination After a Hearing Explained

In annulling the ruling of the Housing Authority because it was not supported by substantial evidence, the Second Department explained its role in reviewing an administrative ruling after a hearing:

“Judicial review of an administrative determination made after a hearing required by law is limited to whether that determination is supported by substantial evidence” … . Substantial evidence has been defined as “such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact”… . While the level of proof is less than a preponderance of the evidence, substantial evidence does not arise from bare surmise, conjecture, speculation, or rumor …, or from the absence of evidence supporting a contrary conclusion … .

Here, the Housing Authority’s determination that the petitioner allowed her father to reside with her without notice to or approval from the Housing Authority in violation of the rules and regulations of the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program was not supported by substantial evidence. Matter of Harrison v Palumbo, 2014 NY Slip OP 07510, 2nd Dept 11-5-14

 

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