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Electronic Documents Constitute “Tangible Personal Property” and Can Therefore Be the Subject of a Conversion Cause of Action

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly denied a motion for summary judgment dismissing the conversion cause of action, finding that electronic documents constitute “identifiable tangible personal property” and therefor can be the subject of a conversion action:

The subject matter of a conversion cause of action ” must constitute identifiable tangible personal property’; real property and interests in business opportunities will not suffice” … . However, electronic documents stored on a computer may be the subject of a conversion claim just as printed versions of the documents may … . On their cross motion, the defendants failed to demonstrate that the client accounts alleged to have been converted did not exist in tangible form, such as computerized or paper client lists. Accordingly, that branch of the cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the conversion cause of action was properly denied, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s opposing papers … . Volodarsky v Moonlight Ambulette Serv Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 07498, 2nd Dept 11-5-14

 

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