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Re: a Slip and Fall in a McDonald’s Restaurant, the McDonald’s Defendants Were Not Liable as an Out-of-Possession Landlord, a Franchisor, or a Property Owner—Summary Judgment Properly Granted

In dismissing a slip and fall complaint against the McDonald’s (restaurant) defendants, the Second Department explained that the defendants could not be held liable as an out-of-possession landlord, a franchisor, or as an entity responsible for a dangerous condition on the property:

The McDonald’s defendants established, prima facie, that McDonald’s Corporation was an out-of-possession landlord on the date of the subject accident, and that it had no duty to maintain or repair the leased premises where the accident occurred. Therefore, the McDonald’s defendants met their initial burden of establishing that McDonald’s Corporation owed no duty to the plaintiff … . In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Further, McDonald’s Corporation was not liable based upon its status as a franchisor. In determining whether a defendant, as a franchisor, may be held vicariously liable for the acts of its franchisee, the most significant factor is the degree of control that the franchisor maintains over the daily operations of the franchisee or, more specifically, the manner of performing the very work in the course of which the accident occurred … . Here, the McDonald’s defendants tendered sufficient evidence in support of their motion to establish, prima facie, that McDonald’s Corporation lacked the requisite control over the alleged causes of the plaintiff’s injuries. The plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition.

In addition, the Supreme Court correctly granted that branch of the motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant McDonald’s Restaurants of New York, Inc. Liability for a dangerous condition on property is generally predicated upon ownership, occupancy, control, or special use of the property … . The McDonald’s defendants established, prima facie, that McDonald’s Restaurants of New York, Inc., did not own, occupy, control, or have a special use of the subject property at the time of the accident and, thus, could not be held liable for injuries caused by the allegedly dangerous conditions … . Khanimov v McDonald’s Corp, 2014 NY Slip Op 07332, 2nd Dept 10-29-14

 

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