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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE AWARDED A MONEY JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT PERSONALLY, DEFENDANT WAS ONLY A PARTY TO THE ACTION AS A TRUSTEE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined Supreme Court exceeded its authority when it, sua sponte, awarded a money judgment against defendant personally. Defendant was only a party to the action in his representative capacity (trustee):

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“[A] court may grant relief that is warranted by the facts plainly appearing on the papers on both sides, if the relief granted is not too dramatically unlike the relief sought, the proof offered supports it, and there is no prejudice to any party” … . Here, the Supreme Court not only strayed from this principle … , but did so by purporting to impose liability on an individual who was not even a party to the action. ” It has been repeatedly held that persons suing or being sued in their official or representative capacity are, in contemplation of law, distinct persons, and strangers to any right or liability as an individual, and consequently a former judgment concludes a party only in the character in which he was sued'” … . Magid v Sunrise Holdings Group, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 07718, Second Dept 11-8-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (PARTIES, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE AWARDED A MONEY JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT PERSONALLY, DEFENDANT WAS ONLY A PARTY TO THE ACTION AS A TRUSTEE (SECOND DEPT))/TRUSTS AND ESTATES (CIVIL PROCEDURE, PARTIES, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE AWARDED A MONEY JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT PERSONALLY, DEFENDANT WAS ONLY A PARTY TO THE ACTION AS A TRUSTEE (SECOND DEPT))/TRUSTEES  (CIVIL PROCEDURE, PARTIES, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE AWARDED A MONEY JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT PERSONALLY, DEFENDANT WAS ONLY A PARTY TO THE ACTION AS A TRUSTEE (SECOND DEPT))

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