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No Probable Cause to Search Car Interior After Occupants Were Out of the Car and Patted Down

The Second Department determined the police officer who stopped the car in which defendant was a passenger did not have probable cause to search the interior of the car after the occupants were out of the car and had been patted down.  The court explained the relevant law:

” [A] police officer acting on reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and on an articulable basis to fear for his [or her] own safety may intrude upon the person or personal effects of the suspect only to the extent that is actually necessary to protect himself [or herself] from harm'” … . Therefore, “absent probable cause, it is unlawful for a police officer to invade the interior of a stopped vehicle once the suspects have been removed and patted down without incident, as any immediate threat to the officers’ safety has consequently been eliminated” … . A “narrow exception” to this rule exists in circumstances where:

” following a lawful stop, facts revealed during a proper inquiry or other information gathered during the course of the encounter lead to the conclusion that a weapon located within the vehicle presents an actual and specific danger to the officer’s safety sufficient to justify further intrusion, notwithstanding the suspect’s inability to gain immediate access to that weapon'”… . People v Baksh, 2014 NY Slip Op 00112, 2nd Dept 1-8-14

 

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