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Failure to Inform Defendant of the Specific Period of Postrelease Supervision Applicable to the Offense Defendant Pled To Required Vacation of Sentence

Over a dissent, the Second Department determined the failure to advise the defendant of the specific postrelease-supervision aspect of his sentence at the time of the entry of the plea pursuant to a plea agreement required that the sentence be vacated, even though defendant was informed his maximum sentencing exposure included a period of postrelease supervision:

…[A]fter informing the defendant that his maximum sentencing exposure included a period of postrelease supervision, the court extended a specific sentence offer, specifying the range of the terms of imprisonment involved …, and this offer omitted any reference to postrelease supervision. The court has a duty to ensure, at the time a plea of guilty is entered, that the defendant is aware of the terms of the plea …. The County Court’s failure to inform the defendant, at the time he entered his plea of guilty, that his sentence would, in fact, include a period of postrelease supervision, prevented his plea from being entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. People v Divalentino, 2013 NY Slip Op 06013, 9-25-13

 

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