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Sentencing Court Can Correct Illegal Sentence If Within Initially-Stated Range

The Second Department explained that the trial court can properly resentence a defendant to correct an illegal sentence as long as the new sentence is within the initially-stated range.  Here, after sentencing defendant to an indeterminate term of imprisonment, the court realized it was required to sentence defendant to a determinate term and postrelease supervision:

Under the circumstances of this case, the County Court properly resentenced the defendant. A trial court has the inherent power to correct an illegal sentence, over a defendant’s objection, where the corrected sentence falls within the range initially stated by the court …. Here, after the County Court learned that the indeterminate sentence imposed on the defendant for the conviction of criminal sale of a firearm in the third degree was illegal, it exercised its inherent power to correct the sentence by imposing a determinate term of imprisonment of two years followed by two years of postrelease supervision. This sentence was within the range initially stated by the County Court … . People v Kaufman, 2013 NY slip Op 06020, 2nd Dept 9-25-13

 

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