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LACROSSE PLAYER JOGGING AROUND LACROSSE FIELD ASSUMED THE RISK OF BEING STRUCK BY A LACROSSE BALL.

The Second Department, noting that even bystanders assume the risk of being struck by a ball, determined a lacrosse player who was jogging around the lacrosse field while other players were throwing balls assumed the risk of being struck by a ball:

Pursuant to the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, a participant in a sport or recreational activity consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from such participation … . This doctrine also applies to spectators or bystanders who place themselves in close proximity to a playing field … .

Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that by entering the fenced-off field where players were warming up for lacrosse practice, and jogging around the perimeter of the field where lacrosse balls were being thrown between the players and into the net, the injured plaintiff assumed the risk of being struck by a lacrosse ball … . Spiteri v Bisson, 2015 NY Slip Op 09089, 2nd Dept 12-9-15

MONTHLY COMPILATION INDEX ENTRIES FOR THIS CASE:

NEGLIGENCE (ASSUMPTION OF RISK, PLAYER WARMING UP STRUCK BY LACROSSE BALL)/ASSUMPTION OF RISK (LACROSSE PLAYER STRUCK BY LACROSSE BALL WHILE WARMING UP)

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