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Parent’s Inability to Pay for Juvenile’s Education Does Not Constitute the Abuse, Neglect or Abandonment Required for Special Juvenile Immigrant Status

The Second Department determined the motion for a finding that reunification with one or both of petitioner’s parents was not viable (re: an application for special juvenile immigrant status) was properly denied. The relationship with the juvenile’s parents in Guatemala had never broken down due to abuse, neglect or abandonment. The fact that the juvenile’s parents could not afford to pay for the juvenile’s education did not constitute abuse, neglect or abandonment:

Pursuant to 8 USC § 1101(a)(27)(J) … and 8 CFR 204.11, a “special immigrant” is a resident alien who, inter alia, is under 21 years of age, unmarried, and dependent upon a juvenile court or legally committed to an individual appointed by a State or juvenile court. Additionally, for a juvenile immigrant to qualify for special juvenile immigrant status, a court must find that reunification of the juvenile with one or both of the juvenile’s parents is not viable due to parental abuse, neglect, or abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law (see 8 USC § 1101[a][27][J][i]), and that it would not be in the juvenile’s best interests to be returned to his or her native country or country of last habitual residence (see 8 USC § 1101[a][27][J][ii]…).

Here, the record reflects that Jeison was living with both of his parents in Guatemala until March 2012, when, with their consent, he traveled to the United States to escape gang violence and pursue his studies. After his arrival in the United States, Jeison began to reside with the petitioner, who provided him with food, clothing, and shelter, and Jesion remained in frequent contact with his parents. The inability of Jeison’s parents, who live in poverty, to provide him with a college education, or with financial assistance, does not support a finding that his reunification with his parents was not viable due to parental abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law … . Matter of Jeison P.-C. (Conception P.), 2015 NY Slip Op 07665, 2nd Dept 10-21-15

 

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