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Town Has Duty to Defend Former Town Clerk Accused of Sexual Harassment Within the Scope of Employment

The Second Department determined the Town Law required the town to pay for the defense of the former town clerk accused of sexual harassment within the scope of his employment:

The duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify …, and it is triggered if the civil complaint includes allegations that the employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment at the time of the alleged wrongdoing … . Here, the underlying federal complaint specifically alleges, among other things, that the petitioner committed sexual harassment while acting in the scope of his employment as the Town Clerk, the Town facilitated a hostile work environment, and the Town failed to prevent workplace harassment. Contrary to the Town’s contention, the Supreme Court correctly determined that the allegations in the federal complaint were sufficient to trigger the Town’s broad duty to defend the petitioner … . Matter of Bonilla v Town of Hempstead, 2015 NY Slip Op 06916, 2nd Dept 9-23-15

 

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