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Department of Motor Vehicles Did Not Exceed Its Powers In Promulgating Regulations Re: Lifetime Revocation of Driver’s Licenses, Five-Year Stay of Relicensure, and Subsequent Five-Year Restricted License/Ignition Interlock Period for Alcohol-Related Convictions

The Third Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Peters, over a two-justice dissent, determined that petitioner’s challenges to Department of Motor Vehicles’ (DMV’S) regulations re: (1) the lifetime revocation of a driver’s license for alcohol-related convictions, (2) the five-year stay of relicensure for persons with three alcohol-related convictions, and (3) the subsequent five-year period with the imposition of a restricted license and installation of ignition interlock device, were properly dismissed as nonjusticiable (petitioner not yet affected by any of them). The court went on to determine the DMV, by promulgating these regulations, did not encroach upon the powers of the legislature. The dissenters argued that some of the challenges were justiciable and the DMV in fact exceeded its powers by mandating a five-year stay of relicensure for anyone with three alcohol-related convictions within a 25-year lookback, as well as the subsequent five-year period allowing only a restricted license with the installation of an ignition interlock device. The majority explained the general principles for analyzing whether an agency has exceeded its powers:

To determine whether an administrative agency has usurped the power of the Legislature, courts must consider whether the agency: (1) “operat[ed] outside of its proper sphere of authority” by balancing competing social concerns in reliance “solely on [its] own ideas of sound public policy”; (2) engaged in typical, “interstitial” rulemaking or “wrote on a clean slate, creating its own comprehensive set of rules without the benefit of legislative guidance”; (3) “acted in an area in which the Legislature has repeatedly tried — and failed — to reach agreement in the face of substantial public debate and vigorous lobbying by a variety of interested factions”; and (4) applied its “special expertise or technical competence” to develop the challenged regulations (Boreali v Axelrod, 71 NY2d at 12-14 …).  Matter of Acevedo v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 2015 NY Slip Op 06467, 3rd Dept 8-6-15

 

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