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A Defendant’s Status as an Undocumented Alien Cannot Be the Sole Ground for Imposing Incarceration As Opposed to Probation

In a case of first impression, the Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, determined that a defendant’s status as an undocumented alien cannot constitute the sole reason for a sentence of incarceration as opposed to probation. County Court reasoned that as soon as a sentence of probation was imposed upon an undocumented alien, the defendant would be in violation of probation by virtue of his/her undocumented status. Therefore, County Court concluded, a sentence of probation was not available to any undocumented alien. The Second Department disagreed, holding that a defendant’s status as an undocumented alien can be considered in determining the appropriate sentence, but it cannot be the sole ground for imposing a sentence of incarceration. To pre-determine that an undocumented alien is not eligible for probation violates due process and equal protection, constitutional rights which are afforded undocumented aliens:

… [W]e reach two conclusions. First, courts may appropriately consider a defendant’s undocumented immigration status in imposing criminal sentences. The decision to impose or not impose a sentence of probation may legitimately be affected by factors directly related to undocumented status. Those factors include, but are not necessarily limited to, the likelihood of the defendant’s deportation during the probationary period, the defendant’s history, if any, of repeated departures from and illegal reentries into the United States, the presence or absence of family in the United States, the defendant’s employment history, and the defendant’s legal employability. Second, it is impermissible for a sentencing court to refuse to consider a sentence of probation for an undocumented defendant solely on the basis of his or her immigration status. Doing so violates the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Federal and New York constitutions by treating certain defendants differently from others based upon their undocumented presence in this state. In other words, a defendant’s undocumented immigration status may be a factor a court takes into account in determining whether to include probation as part of a sentence, but such status cannot be the sole factor a court relies upon in denying a probationary sentence and in imposing a term of imprisonment instead. People v Cesar, 2015 NY Slip Op 06252, 2nd Dept 7-22-15

 

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