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Evidence Which Is “Material and Necessary” in the Context of Discovery Is Much Broader in Scope than Evidence Which Is Admissible at Trial

The First Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined that Supreme Court should have allowed discovery of documents relating to a prior steam pipe explosion (in Texas) in the instant proceeding, which also involves a steam pipe explosion. Defendant Con Ed sought the records of defendant Team Industrial Services, Inc. (Team), which applied pipe sealant where both explosions occurred, alleging that the pipe sealant application caused the explosions. The dissent felt the Appellate Division should defer to Supreme Court’s finding, made after an extensive review of the Texas records, that the two incidents were not sufficiently similar to warrant discovery. The First Department explained that the criteria for the reach of discovery is broad and goes beyond what might be admissible at trial:

The words “material and necessary,” as used in CPLR 3101(a) are “to be interpreted liberally to require disclosure . . . of any facts bearing on the controversy” … . “The weight to be given evidence of other [lawsuits or claims] on the issues of notice and causation, and indeed the very admissibility of such evidence . . . are not of concern in the context of disclosure” … .

In our view, the motion court applied too harsh a standard in determining that documents concerning the prior … incident are not discoverable. We are not concerned with the ultimate admissibility of the evidence at trial, but with the discovery of information concerning the prior incident, as to which a more liberal standard applies … . Matter of Steam Pipe Explosion at 41st St. & Lexington Ave., 2015 NY Slip Op 03269, 1st Dept 4-21-15

 

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