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SUPPRESSION OF JUVENILE’S PROVIDING FALSE NAME AND DATE OF BIRTH TO POLICE OFFICER PROPERLY DENIED; JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ADJUDICATION BASED UPON THE FALSE PEDIGREE INFORMATION PROPER.

The First Department, over an extensive dissent, determined suppression of the juvenile’s giving a false name and date of birth when asked for that information by a police officer was properly denied. The juvenile was warned by the officer that providing false pedigree information would result in a false personation charge (a class B misdemeanor). The juvenile was in fact found to have committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would constitute false personation. The court further determined the sentence of probation was the least restrictive alternative consistent with the juvenile’s needs. The dissent focused on the propriety of the sentence. With respect to the denial of the suppression motion, the court explained:

The court properly denied appellant’s motion to suppress her statement to the police, in which she gave a false name and date of birth, resulting in the false personation charge (Penal Law § 190.23). The police had probable cause to believe appellant was a runaway … . The then 14-year-old appellant, who appeared to be as young as 13, was alone in a PATH station in New Jersey, but she vaguely claimed to live in “upstate” New York. In addition, she had a bruised eye and was wearing provocative clothing, suggesting the possibility of some kind of sexual exploitation. The police were entitled to ask pedigree questions without Miranda warnings, even though an officer warned appellant, as required by the false personation statute, that providing false information would result in an additional charge … . Matter of Christy C., 2016 NY Slip Op 00095, 1st Dept 1-12-16

 

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