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Plaintiff Entitled to Summary Judgment Where Defendant Crossed Into Her Lane Attempting to Make a Left Turn

The Fourth Department determined plaintiff (Daniels) whose car was struck head-on by defendant (Rumsey), whose car crossed into plaintiff’s lane attempting to make a left turn into a parking lot, was entitled to summary judgment, even though plaintiff may have been driving five miles an hour above the speed-limit:

…[W]e conclude that the court properly granted Daniels’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and cross claims against her.  Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141, “[t]he driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left . . . into . . . [a] private road[] or driveway shall yield the right of way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close as to constitute an immediate hazard.” To meet her initial burden on her motion, Daniels was required “to establish both that [Rumsey’s] vehicle suddenly entered the lane where [Daniels] was operating [her vehicle] in a lawful and prudent manner and that there was nothing [Daniels] could have done to avoid the collision” … .  Daniels met that burden by submitting evidence that the accident occurred after Rumsey turned her vehicle left into Daniels’s path of travel in the southbound curb lane of Delaware Avenue, that Daniels had the right-of-way, and that Daniels was proceeding at a speed of between 30 and 35 miles per hour at the time of the accident, i.e., no more than five miles per hour above the posted speed limit.  Daniels also established that she did not see Rumsey’s vehicle until its grill was in her lane of travel, and that she had only “[f]ractions of a second” to take evasive measures, which proved unsuccessful.  Contrary to Rumsey’s contention, the fact that Daniels may have been driving at a speed in excess of five miles per hour over the posted speed limit of 30 miles per hour is inconsequential inasmuch as there is no indication that she could have avoided the accident even if she had been traveling at a speed at or below the posted speed limit … . Daniels v Rumsey, 1168, 4th Dept 11-15-13

 

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