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THE BURGLARY COUNT CHARGED THAT DEFENDANT ENTERED THE VICTIM’S APARTMENT WITH THE INTENT TO “HOLD A KNIFE TO THE VICTIM’S THROAT;” THE JURY WAS INSTRUCTED ONLY THAT DEFENDANT ENTERED THE APARTMENT WITH THE INTENT TO “COMMIT A CRIME;” DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO REQUEST A JURY INSTRUCTION TAILORED TO MATCH THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INDICTMENT (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s burglary conviction on ineffective assistance grounds, determined defense counsel should have insisted on a jury instruction which reflected the crime charged in the indictment. The indictment alleged defendant entered the victim’s apartment with the intent to hold a knife to the victim’s throat. The jury was instructed that it need only find defendant unlawfully entered and remained in the victim’s apartment with the intent “to commit a crime” with no mention of holding a knife to the victim’s throat. At trial whether defendant possessed a knife was contested and defendant was acquitted of criminal possession of a weapon and menacing:

In its charge to the jury, County Court made no mention of the People’s theory of the crime as limited by the indictment. The court charged, with respect to the intent element, that the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant entered or remained in the building “with the intent to commit a crime inside the building,” without specifying the intended crime. Defense counsel did not seek a tailored instruction limited to the theory in the indictment.

“There is no requirement that the People allege or establish what particular crime was intended,” to secure a conviction for burglary … . However, “[i]f the People . . . expressly limit[ ] their theory of the ‘intent to commit a crime therein’ element to a particular crime, then they . . . have . . . to prove that the defendant intended to commit that crime” … .

Here, defense counsel failed to seek an appropriately tailored instruction to the jury on burglary in the second degree or object to the burglary charge given. Defense counsel thereby permitted the jury to convict defendant upon a theory of the intent element that was not set forth in the indictment … . People v Mcclendon, 2024 NY Slip Op 03260, Fourth Dept 6-14-24

Practice Point: If the burglary count in the indictment charges that defendant unlawfully entered the victim’s apartment to “hold a knife to the victim’s throat,” the jury instruction should match the language in the indictment. Here the jury was instructed it need only find that defendant entered the apartment “to commit a crime” with no mention of a knife. Whether there was a knife was contested at trial and defendant was acquitted of criminal possession of a weapon and menacing. Under those facts, defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction which matched the knife-related crime charged in the indictment.

 

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