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Release Applied to Claims Unknown at the Time the Release Was Signed and to Claims Among Parties on the Same Side of the Underlying Lawsuit

The First Department determined the language of the release was broad enough to include claims not known to exist at the time the release was signed and claims among parties on the same side in the suit:

According to the language of the agreement, the release broadly barred “all and/or any” claims “arising from” or “resulting from” or “in connection with” “any act [etc.] concerning [the Fund].” This Court has actually construed similar broad language to bar fraud claims relating to the subject matter where the signatories to the agreement did not specifically refer to, or even know about, those fraud claims before executing their release … . Similarly, courts have given effect to releases even when the releasors are subjectively unaware of the precise claims they are releasing … .

* * *  … [T]he language in the release simply states that “each Party . . . irrevocably and fully releases and forever discharges each other Party.” Had the parties wanted to release only specific individuals or entities, the agreement provided the language by which the parties could have done so. Thus, the release here at issue makes clear that each individual party released each other individual party regardless of the position in which those parties stood at the time they signed the release. Long v O’Neill, 2015 NY Slip Op 01733, 1st Dept 3-3-15

 

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