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Four-Month Statute of Limitations for Challenging Termination of a Firefighter Runs from the Effective Date of Termination, Not the Date of Notification

The Second Department noted that the four-month statute of limitations for challenging the termination of a probationary firefighter ran from the effective date of the termination, not the date of notification of the termination:

“[A] proceeding against a body or officer must be commenced within four months after the determination to be reviewed becomes final and binding upon the petitioner” (CPLR 217[1]). Where, as here, a governmental employee is not entitled to a hearing in connection with his or her discharge, the limitations period for commencing a CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge that discharge “runs from the notice of discharge or the effective date of discharge, if later” … .

Here, although the petitioner was notified of the termination of his probationary employment by letter dated September 13, 2013, and was told not to report for further shifts, the notice set the effective termination date of the petitioner’s probationary employment as September 23, 2013. Accordingly, … the statute of limitations began to run on September 23, 2013. Matter of Bruno v Greenville Fire Dist, 2015 NY Slip Op 01630, 2nd Dept 2-25-15

 

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