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Petitioners, Who Did Not Represent a Majority of the Elected Board of Directors, Did Not Have Standing the Seek Dissolution of the Corporation Under Business Corporation Law 1102/Criteria for Common-Law Dissolution Not Met

The Second Department determined Supreme Court correctly found that the petitioners did not have standing to seek dissolution of the corporation pursuant to Business Corporation Law 1102.  However, the Second Department found Supreme Court erred when it granted the petition under a common-law dissolution theory, a ground not raised by the parties and not applicable under the facts:

…[T]he Supreme Court properly determined that [petitioners] lacked standing to seek dissolution of Candlewood pursuant to Business Law § 1102, since they do not represent a majority of the corporation’s duly elected board of directors … . However, as the appellants correctly contend, the court should have dismissed the petition rather than grant the petition for dissolution on a ground that was not raised by the petitioners and was inapplicable to the circumstances. “[T]he remedy of common-law dissolution is available only to minority shareholders who accuse the majority shareholders and/or the corporate officers or directors of looting the corporation and violating their fiduciary duty” … . The petitioners did not allege that a majority of shareholders, the directors, or the officers looted the corporation or breached a fiduciary duty to … a minority shareholder. Matter of Candlewood Holdings Inc …, 2015 NY Slip Op 00533, 2nd Dept 1-21-15

 

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