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POSSIBLE CONFUSION ABOUT WHICH MICHAEL YACUBICH AT THE SAME ADDRESS WAS THE “MIKE YACUBICH” SEEKING TO BE PLACED ON THE BALLOT FOR ASSEMBLY WAS NOT A PROPER GROUND FOR INVALIDATING THE DESIGNATING PETITION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court , determined petitioner's designating petition for the nomination of the Republican Party as a candidate for the Assembly should not have been invalidated on the ground that there were two voters registered at petitioner's address with similar names (father and son). Father and son are named Michael Yacubich and petitioner sought to be placed on the ballot as Mike Yacubich:

The Board exceeded its authority when it invalidated the designating petition on the ground that it could not identify which registered voter was the candidate. As amplified by the testimony of one of the Commissioners, the Board perceived that the similarity between the two names was confusing. “[B]oards of election have no power to deal with questions of fact or with objections involving matters not appearing upon the face of the petition, and . . . such extrinsic matters, if any, are to be determined in court proceedings only” … . “[T]he board's power to determine the validity of a [designating or] nominating petition extends only to ministerial examination and the board may not go behind a petition designating candidates for primary election” … . Candidates are permitted to run for office using a familiar name or nickname … . Similar to objections raising allegations of fraud  … , the issue of whether a candidate's name is confusing because it is similar to another voter's name involves a matter extrinsic to the designating petition itself and, thus, is a matter for judicial consideration and not for the Board of Elections. Accordingly, the Board lacked the authority to rule on the objection based upon its perception that the petition was confusing because of the candidate's name, which should have been raised through a judicial proceeding to invalidate. Matter of Yacubich v Suffolk County Bd. of Elections, 2018 NY Slip Op 05912, Second Dept 8-24-18

ELECTION LAW (POSSIBLE CONFUSION ABOUT WHICH MICHAEL YACUBICH AT THE SAME ADDRESS WAS THE “MIKE YACUBICH” SEEKING TO BE PLACED ON THE BALLOT FOR ASSEMBLY WAS NOT A PROPER GROUND FOR INVALIDATING THE DESIGNATING PETITION (SECOND DEPT))

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