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No Constitutional Issue Raised by Claim that County Is Paying Too High a “Mobility Tax” Because It Does Not Receive as Much Transit Service as Other Counties Paying the Same Amount

The Third Department affirmed the dismissal of two causes of action brought by a county challenging a “mobility tax” imposed upon counties served by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA).  The county alleged the mobility tax was disproportionately high because it did not receive as much service as other counties paying the same amount:

The gravamen of both claims is that the funding provided to the MTA by the County is disproportionately high when compared to the transit services received by it in return.  The MTA undoubtedly provides services to the County and its residents, however, and “[e]ven a ‘flagrant unevenness’ in application” of the financing scheme used to fund the MTA is constitutionally permissible … .

Without more, the fact that the County purportedly receives “fewer benefits from the [MTA] than those received by other[s] . . . is insufficient to warrant the relief requested” … .  Plaintiffs have not pointed to any constitutional or statutory provision that is violated by this alleged misallocation of resources and, as such, the sixth and seventh causes of action present nothing more than a nonjusticiable and impermissible attempt “to substitute judicial oversight for the discretionary management of public business by public officials” … .  Supreme Court thus acted properly in granting the MTA defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  Vanderhoff… v Silver, 516180, 3rd Dept 12-19-13

 

 

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