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DEFENDANT ATTEMPTED A TURN IN VIOLATION OF THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW WHICH CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE PER SE, CO-DEFENDANTS, WHOSE TRUCK COLLIDED WITH THE CAR DRIVEN BY THE DEFENDANT WHO VIOLATED THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the truck defendants’ (Crown and Kumar’s) motion for summary judgment in this traffic accident case should have been granted. Another defendant, Ferreira, had cut the truck off attempting to make a right turn from the left lane. Ferreira’s actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident:

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Ferreira’s testimony indicated that she violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128(a), which states that “[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.” Therefore, she was negligent as a matter of law … . The appellants further established that Kumar was not negligent, since he took prompt evasive action by applying his brakes hard.

Thus, by demonstrating that Ferreira was negligent and that her negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident, the appellants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. In opposition, the plaintiff and Ferreira failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the appellants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them should have been granted. Pipinias v Ferreira, 2017 NY Slip Op 08400, Second Dept 11-29-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, DEFENDANT ATTEMPTED A TURN IN VIOLATION OF THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW WHICH CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE PER SE, CO-DEFENDANTS, WHOSE TRUCK COLLIDED WITH THE CAR DRIVEN BY THE DEFENDANT WHO VIOLATED THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (DEFENDANT ATTEMPTED A TURN IN VIOLATION OF THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW WHICH CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE PER SE, CO-DEFENDANTS, WHOSE TRUCK COLLIDED WITH THE CAR DRIVEN BY THE DEFENDANT WHO VIOLATED THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))/VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (NEGLIGENCE PER SE,  DEFENDANT ATTEMPTED A TURN IN VIOLATION OF THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW WHICH CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE PER SE, CO-DEFENDANTS, WHOSE TRUCK COLLIDED WITH THE CAR DRIVEN BY THE DEFENDANT WHO VIOLATED THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW, ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT))

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