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Complaint by Members of a Congregation against the Congregation’s Board of Trustees Stemming from the Termination of a Rabbi Reinstated—Criteria for Motions to Dismiss, Statutory Interpretation Principles, Criteria for Stating a Defamation Cause of Action, and the Qualified Immunity Afforded Board Members by the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law Discussed in Some Depth

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dickerson, reversed Supreme Court's dismissal of a complaint against the congregation's board of trustees by members of the congregation alleging causes of action stemming from the board's termination of a Rabbi. The Second Department held Supreme Court had not properly interpreted the Religious Corporations Law and the congregation's by-laws (Supreme Court had erroneously concluded the board had the power to act as it did under the statute and by-laws). The court further held the complaint sufficiently alleged malice in support of the defamation cause of action and sufficiently alleged the qualified immunity afforded board members by the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law may not apply.  The court discussed the criteria for a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, statutory interpretation principles, the elements of defamation, and the qualified immunity afforded board members by the Not-for-Profit-Corporation Law in some depth. Only a portion of the statutory-interpretation discussion is quoted here.  Supreme Court had interpreted the statutory phrase “The trustees … shall have no power to settle or remove or fix the salary of the minister…” to refer only to the trustees' actions concerning “the salary of the minister.”  The Second Department interpreted the phrase to mean the trustees have no power to “settle,” “remove,” or “fix the salary of” the minister:

We conclude that a more natural reading of the provision “[t]he trustees . . . shall have no power to settle or remove or fix the salary of the minister” (Religious Corporations Law § 200) establishes that “settle or remove” do not modify “the salary of the minister.” Rather, a more natural reading of this passage would be that the terms “settle,” “remove,” and “fix the salary of” all modify “the minister.” Under this reading, the trustees have no power to settle, or hire, the minister; they have no power to remove, or terminate the engagement of, the minister; and, finally, they have no power to fix the salary of the minister.

Under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the relevant language, the words “settle” and “fix” would have the same meaning, thus rendering one of these terms superfluous. ” Words are not to be rejected as superfluous where it is practicable to give each a distinct and separate meaning'” (…see McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 231). Moreover, the Supreme Court's interpretation would lead to the somewhat unnatural provision for the “removal” of a clergyperson's salary. Furthermore, the use of the word “or” to separate each of the three terms suggests an intent to distinguish three distinct concepts.

Additionally, our interpretation of the statute, prohibiting the trustees from settling or removing the minister, or fixing his or her salary, is supported by the consistent, and quite similar, language set forth in Religious Corporations Law § 5. We note in this regard that ” [a] statute or legislative act is to be construed as a whole, and all parts of an act are to be read and construed together to determine the legislative intent'” … . Kamchi v Weissman, 2014 NY Slip Op 09109, 2nd Dept 12-31-14


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