You are here: / / PLAINTIFF, WHO LOST HIS JOB AFTER HIS MORTGAGE HAD BEEN APPROVED AND THE...

PLAINTIFF, WHO LOST HIS JOB AFTER HIS MORTGAGE HAD BEEN APPROVED AND THE MORTGAGE CONTINGENCY IN THE PURCHASE CONTRACT WAS SATISFIED, WAS ENTITLED TO THE RETURN OF THE DEPOSIT, THE REVOCATION OF THE MORTGAGE COMMITMENT WAS NOT DUE TO BAD FAITH ON PLAINTIFF’S PART (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff was entitled to return of his deposit in this real estate transaction. The contract allowed the return of the deposit if plaintiff did not qualify for a mortgage within a specified period of time. Plaintiff did qualify within the allowed time. However, he subsequently lost his job and could not obtain the mortgage. Plaintiff asked for the deposit but defendant refused:

” A mortgage contingency clause is construed to create a condition precedent to the contract of sale'” … . “The purchaser is entitled to return of the down payment where the mortgage contingency clause unequivocally provides for its return upon the purchaser’s inability to obtain a mortgage commitment within the contingency period”… . “However, when the lender revokes the mortgage commitment after the contingency period has elapsed, the contractual provision relating to failure to obtain an initial commitment is inoperable, and the question becomes whether the lender’s revocation was attributable to any bad faith on the part of the purchaser”… .

Here, the plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law for the return of his down payment. He submitted evidence that he acted in good faith in obtaining a mortgage commitment, that the commitment was subject to re-verification of employment, and that the subsequent revocation of the commitment was not attributable to any bad faith on his part … . Chahalis v Roberta Ebert Irrevocable Trust, 2018 NY Slip Op 05135, Second Dept 7-11-18

REAL ESTATE (PLAINTIFF, WHO LOST HIS JOB AFTER HIS MORTGAGE HAD BEEN APPROVED AND THE MORTGAGE CONTINGENCY IN THE PURCHASE CONTRACT WAS SATISFIED, WAS ENTITLED TO THE RETURN OF THE DEPOSIT, THE REVOCATION OF THE MORTGAGE COMMITMENT WAS NOT DUE TO BAD FAITH ON PLAINTIFF’S PART (SECOND DEPT))/DEPOSIT (REAL ESTATE, PLAINTIFF, WHO LOST HIS JOB AFTER HIS MORTGAGE HAD BEEN APPROVED AND THE MORTGAGE CONTINGENCY IN THE PURCHASE CONTRACT WAS SATISFIED, WAS ENTITLED TO THE RETURN OF THE DEPOSIT, THE REVOCATION OF THE MORTGAGE COMMITMENT WAS NOT DUE TO BAD FAITH ON PLAINTIFF’S PART (SECOND DEPT))/MORTGAGE COMMITMENT (REAL ESTATE, PLAINTIFF, WHO LOST HIS JOB AFTER HIS MORTGAGE HAD BEEN APPROVED AND THE MORTGAGE CONTINGENCY IN THE PURCHASE CONTRACT WAS SATISFIED, WAS ENTITLED TO THE RETURN OF THE DEPOSIT, THE REVOCATION OF THE MORTGAGE COMMITMENT WAS NOT DUE TO BAD FAITH ON PLAINTIFF’S PART (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
THERE EXISTS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE LAW DAY CLOSING WAS WILLFUL WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT, PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION SEEKING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ACTION TO RETAIN THE DOWN PAYMENT PROPERLY DENIED, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SEEKING THE RETURN OF THE DOWN PAYMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
SUPREME COURT IMPROPERLY, SUA SPONTE, ORDERED A FRYE HEARING AFTER WHICH THE COMPLAINT AGAINST A DOCTOR IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION WAS, SUA SPONTE, DISMISSED, SUPREME COURT IMPROPERLY USED A FRYE HEARING TO AVOID THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE.
THE PEOPLE DID NOT MEET THEIR BURDEN TO SHOW THE LEGALITY OF THE SEIZURE OF DEFENDANT’S CLOTHES BY A DETECTIVE AT THE HOSPITAL WHERE DEFENDANT WAS BEING TREATED FOR A GUNSHOT WOUND; THE CLOTHES AND THE DNA EVIDENCE TAKEN FROM THE CLOTHES SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS HOWEVER (SECOND DEPT).
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED SOLELY ON THE GROUND THAT THE AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE WAS FILED IN THE WRONG COURT.
PLAINTIFF ALLEGED HE WAS STANDING ON AN A-FRAME LADDER WHEN IT SHIFTED CAUSING A CONCRETE SLAB TO FALL ON HIS HAND; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; IN ADDITION A DEFENDANT FAILED TO SHOW IT WAS NOT AN “OWNER” WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240(1) (SECOND DEPT).
Defective Handrail Could Have Been Factor in Plaintiff’s Injuries.
PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT RAISED ISSUES OF FACT ABOUT WHETHER EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS CAUSED THE INJURY TO PLAINTIFF; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE DEFENSE AND PROSECUTION’S JOINT REQUEST TO HAVE THE DEFENDANT’S COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL EVALUATED; ONCE A DEFENDANT IS DEEMED COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL, THE DECISION WHETHER TO PRESENT AN INSANITY DEFENSE IS THE DEFENDANT’S, NOT THE COURT’S, TO MAKE (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

$1.5 MILLION VERDICT AFFIRMED, PLAINTIFF, A 72-YEAR-OLD WOMAN, WAS INJURED WHEN... PROPERTY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO JOIN THE SLIP AND FALL ACTION WITH A MEDICAL...