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UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE DEFENSE AND PROSECUTION’S JOINT REQUEST TO HAVE THE DEFENDANT’S COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL EVALUATED; ONCE A DEFENDANT IS DEEMED COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL, THE DECISION WHETHER TO PRESENT AN INSANITY DEFENSE IS THE DEFENDANT’S, NOT THE COURT’S, TO MAKE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the convictions, determined: (1) the trial judge should not have rejected the request by both defense counsel and the prosecutor to have the defendant’s mental health and fitness for trial evaluated; and (2) once a defendant is found competent to stand trial the decision whether to present an insanity defense is the defendant’s alone. Here defense counsel was ordered by the judge to present an insanity defense, over defendant’s objection:

… [W]hen confronted with evidence that the defendant was not taking his required medication and was not able to communicate rationally with his attorney, the Supreme Court should have granted the joint applications of the People and the defense to have the defendant examined pursuant to CPL 730.30(1) to determine his fitness to proceed … . …

… [A] defendant found competent to stand trial has the ultimate authority, even over counsel’s objection, to reject the use of a psychiatric defense … . Thus, once the Supreme Court determined the defendant to be competent to stand trial, it should not have interfered with that authority by “order[ing]” defense counsel, over the defendant’s objection, to present an insanity defense. People v Bellucci, 2020 NY Slip Op 07215, Second Dept 12-2-20

 

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