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CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A PARTY IS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER IN LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) ACTIONS EXPLAINED, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A LADDER, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department determined Supreme Court should not have determined defendant (Rose Associates) was not a statutory agent of the owner in this Labor Law 240 (1) and 24 1 (6) action, explaining the correct criteria. In addition Supreme Court should not have denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action, which was based upon the allegation the ladder plaintiff was on moved:

The motion court erred in determining that Rose Associates is not an agent of defendant owner Continental Towers Condominium. Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) impose absolute liability on owners, contractors, and their agents for a statutory violation resulting in injury, regardless of whether they directed or controlled the work … . Thus…  the test of whether a defendant is a statutory agent subject to liability under those sections is not whether it actually supervised the work, but whether it had the authority to do so … . …

… [T]he court should have granted plaintiff’s cross motion, as the evidence establishes that plaintiff slipped or fell from an unsecured ladder upon which he was working because it moved … . The testimony of plaintiff’s coworker that plaintiff stated he slipped was “not inconsistent with plaintiff’s version that he slipped after the ladder moved” … . Moreover, defendants’ expert affidavits asserting that no force acted upon the ladder that could have caused it to move were speculative. Merino v Continental Towers Condominium, 2018 NY Slip Op 01549, First Dept 3-8-18

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A PARTY IS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER IN LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) ACTIONS EXPLAINED, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A LADDER, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED (FIRST DEPT))/STATUTORY AGENT (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A PARTY IS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER IN LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) ACTIONS EXPLAINED, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A LADDER, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED (FIRST DEPT))/LADDERS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE OF ACTION, STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A LADDER, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED (FIRST DEPT))

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EVIDENCE PETITIONER HAD ACCESS TO THE AREA WHERE THE CONTRABAND WAS FOUND WAS... PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CAUSE...