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UNDER THE DRUG LAW REFORM ACT (DRLA) A DEFENDANT CONVICTED OF A QUALIFYING DRUG FELONY CANNOT BE SENTENCED AS A PERSISTENT FELONY OFFENDER (FOURTH DEPT). ​

The Fourth Department, reversing County Court, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice DeJoseph, in a matter of first impression, determined a defendant convicted of a qualifying drug felony cannot, under the Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA), be sentenced as a persistent felony offender (PFO):

In March 2016, defendant, by counsel, moved pursuant to CPL 440.20 to vacate his sentence on the ground that he was illegally sentenced as a PFO. Defendant contended that, because the crimes of CPCS in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.16 [1]) and CSCS in the third degree (§ 220.39 [1]) fall within Penal Law article 220, a defendant convicted of those crimes is not subject to sentencing as a PFO. Defendant contended that the 2004 DLRA removed the trial court’s discretion to sentence a defendant convicted of controlled substance or marihuana offenses as a PFO. * * *

The plain language of the statutes is clear that, when a defendant is convicted of a drug offense, he or she must be sentenced under the provisions outlined by Penal Law § 60.04, “notwithstanding the provisions of any law.” Thus, inasmuch as section 60.04 does not authorize sentencing such a defendant as a PFO, such a defendant cannot be sentenced pursuant to any provisions that do authorize sentencing as a PFO. While there are no definitive rulings on this issue by the Court of Appeals or any of the Appellate Divisions, trial courts have held that a drug offender is ineligible for PFO sentencing … .

As noted by the Court of Appeals, “when the legislature enacted the . . . DLRA, it sought to ameliorate the excessive punishments meted out to low-level, nonviolent drug offenders under the so-called Rockefeller Drug Laws, and therefore the statute is designed to spread relief as widely as possible, within the bounds of reason, to its intended beneficiaries” … . We believe that our interpretation of the DLRA is consistent with the remedial purpose of the DLRA, and we therefore conclude that Penal Law §§ 60.04 and 70.70 operate to preclude a court from sentencing a defendant found guilty of a qualifying drug felony as a PFO. People v Boykins, 2018 NY Slip Op 02919, Fourth Dept 4-27-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (UNDER THE DRUG LAW REFORM ACT (DRLA) A DEFENDANT CONVICTED OF A QUALIFYING DRUG FELONY CANNOT BE SENTENCED AS A PERSISTENT FELONY OFFENDER (FOURTH DEPT))/SENTENCING (PERSISTENT FELONY OFFENDER, UNDER THE DRUG LAW REFORM ACT (DRLA) A DEFENDANT CONVICTED OF A QUALIFYING DRUG FELONY CANNOT BE SENTENCED AS A PERSISTENT FELONY OFFENDER (FOURTH DEPT))/DRUG LAW REFORM ACT (PERSISTENT FELONY OFFENDER, UNDER THE DRUG LAW REFORM ACT (DRLA) A DEFENDANT CONVICTED OF A QUALIFYING DRUG FELONY CANNOT BE SENTENCED AS A PERSISTENT FELONY OFFENDER (FOURTH DEPT))/PERSISTENT FELONY OFFENDER (DRUG LAW REFORM ACT (DLRA), UNDER THE DRUG LAW REFORM ACT (DRLA) A DEFENDANT CONVICTED OF A QUALIFYING DRUG FELONY CANNOT BE SENTENCED AS A PERSISTENT FELONY OFFENDER (FOURTH DEPT))

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