Failure to Disclose Witness Was a Paid Informant Required Vacation of Conviction
The Fourth Department reversed County Court, finding that defendant’s CPL 440 motion seeking vacation of the conviction should have been granted. The People failed to disclose that a prosecution witness was a paid informant:
We note at the outset that the following quote from People v Fuentes (12 NY3d 259, 263, rearg denied 13 NY3d 766) is instructive: “[t]he Due Process Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions both guarantee a criminal defendant the right to discover favorable evidence in the People’s possession material to guilt or punishment .. . [, and i]mpeachment evidence falls within the ambit of a prosecutor’s Brady obligation . . . To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that (1) the evidence is favorable to the defendant because it is either exculpatory or impeaching in nature; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution; and (3) prejudice arose because the suppressed evidence was material . . . In New York, where a defendant makes a specific request for a document, the materiality element is established provided there exists a ‘reasonable possibility’ that it would have changed the result of the proceedings” … .
Here, there is no dispute that defendant satisfied the first element of the Fuentes test inasmuch as the People do not dispute that the prosecution witness at issue was a paid informant and do not contend that evidence of the status of that witness is not favorable to defendant. … “[T]he mandate of Brady extends beyond any particular prosecutor’s actual knowledge” …, and “ ‘the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police’ ” … .
We further conclude that the court should have granted defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion insofar as it sought vacatur of the judgment of conviction on the basis of the Brady issue. Here, defendant made a specific request for Brady material including agreements between the People and their witnesses, disclosure of whether any information was provided by an informant, and the substance of that informant’s information. We conclude that “there exists a ‘reasonable possibility’ that [such material] would have changed the result of the proceedings”… . People v Gayden…, 1095, 4th Dept 11-15-13