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You are here: Home1 / Civil Procedure2 / EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY, A JURY COULD FIND THAT PLAINTIFF’S...
Civil Procedure, Evidence, Negligence, Vehicle and Traffic Law

EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY, A JURY COULD FIND THAT PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE WAS ALREADY IN THE INTERSECTION AND DEFENDANT FAILED TO USE REASONABLE CARE TO AVOID THE COLLISION; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE TO THE VEHICLES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED IN THE LIABLITY PORTION OF THE TRIAL BECAUSE THE NATURE OF THE DAMAGE HAD SOME RELEVANCE TO LIABILITY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court and ordering a new trial in this intersection traffic-accident case, determined defendants were not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint at the close of plaintiff’s case. The Second Department held that a jury could find that, although defendant (Capobianco) had the right of way, plaintiff was already in the intersection and Capobianco failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid the collision. In addition, the Second Department found that Supreme Court should not have excluded evidence of the damage to the vehicles because the damage was relevant to liability for failure to see what should have been seen:

Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(a), a driver entering an intersection controlled by a stop sign must yield the right-of-way to any other vehicle that is already in the intersection or that is approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard … , and a driver with the right-of-way is entitled to assume that other drivers will obey the traffic law requiring them to yield … . A driver also has a common-law duty to see that which should have been seen through the proper use of the driver’s senses … . Thus, while a driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle that has failed to yield is not comparatively negligent for failing to avoid the collision … , he or she still has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid a collision with another vehicle already in the intersection … .

Here, affording the plaintiff every inference which may properly be drawn from the facts presented, and considering the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is a rational process by which the jury could have found that even if Capobianco had the right-of-way, the plaintiff’s vehicle was already in the intersection, and that Capobianco failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid the collision … . Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint.

In addition, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in precluding photographs depicting the nature and extent of damage to the parties’ vehicles after the accident. Even where a trial is bifurcated, some evidence of damages may nevertheless be admitted, in the trial court’s discretion, to establish liability at the liability phase of the trial, so long as such evidence is probative of liability and accompanied by an appropriate limiting instruction … . Pruessen v Richard Capobianco, Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 06155, Second Dept 10-21-26

Practice Point: A driver who had the right of way may still be liable in an intersection traffic accident if the other driver was already in the intersection and the driver who had the right of way did not exercise reasonable care to avoid the collision.

Practice Point: In a bifurcated traffic-accident trial, evidence of the nature of the damage to the vehicles may have relevance to liability and, if so, should be admitted.

 

October 21, 2026
Tags: Second Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-10-21 13:00:062026-10-30 16:15:12EVEN THOUGH DEFENDANT HAD THE RIGHT OF WAY, A JURY COULD FIND THAT PLAINTIFF’S VEHICLE WAS ALREADY IN THE INTERSECTION AND DEFENDANT FAILED TO USE REASONABLE CARE TO AVOID THE COLLISION; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE TO THE VEHICLES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRECLUDED IN THE LIABLITY PORTION OF THE TRIAL BECAUSE THE NATURE OF THE DAMAGE HAD SOME RELEVANCE TO LIABILITY (SECOND DEPT).
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