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HERE THE PERMANENT STAIRWAY WHERE PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED, THE SOLE VIABLE MEANS OF ACCESS TO THE WORK SITE, CONSTITUTED A “SAFETY DEVICE” WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240(1); PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the permanent stairway where plaintiff was injured, which had worn or missing treads, was the sole viable means of access to the floors where plaintiff was working. Although another stairway was available, plaintiff was told not to use it because it was used by COVID patients. Therefore plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. The First Department rejected the argument that Labor Law liability was not available because plaintiff was not working on the stairway itself. The First Department also rejected the argument that a permanent stairway is not a statutory safety device:

The statute protects a worker from gravity-related hazards posed by a permanent stairway that “provided the sole means of access to the floors of the building” where the worker was working … . However, the issue of whether a stairway is the sole means of access should not be construed so strictly as to “preclude recovery merely because plaintiff had an alternative means to descend from his work area, especially when that alternative route may have seemed more dangerous than the stairs plaintiff did utilize” … . Here, the only other staircase available to plaintiff at the worksite would have required him to access a stairway used by hospital patients during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, which he was instructed not to use. As a result, under these facts, the purported alternative staircase did not present a viable means of egress for plaintiff, and the staircase plaintiff used was his sole means of access to his work area … . Moreover, the stairs were defective in that the treads were worn out or missing.

We have considered and rejected … the argument that the statute does not cover permanent staircases … . As we recently explained, “permanent staircases are not categorically excluded from Labor Law 240(1) coverage,” and will qualify as a safety device under the Labor Law where the staircase is the sole means accessing the plaintiff’s work area … .

… Supreme Court improperly concluded that this principle applies only in situations where the plaintiff was required to work on the staircase upon which he fell … .

Supreme Court’s … conclusion that a plaintiff using a permanent staircase as a “passageway” will not give rise to Labor Law 240(1) liability is also misplaced … .  Riley v Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., 2026 NY Slip Op 05241, First Dept 9-10-26

Practice Point: A permanent stairway which is the sole viable means of access to a work site is a “safety device” within the meaning of Labor Law 240(1).

 

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