You are here: / / Criteria for Common Carrier Liability for Injury Caused by a Sudden Stop...
,

Criteria for Common Carrier Liability for Injury Caused by a Sudden Stop Explained (Not Met Here)

In affirming the grant of summary judgment to the defendant transit authority, the Second Department explained the circumstances under which a common carrier may be liable for injuries to a passenger caused by a sudden stop:

To prevail on a cause of action alleging that a common carrier was negligent in stopping a bus, a plaintiff must prove that the stop was unusual and violent, rather than merely one of the sort of ‘jerks and jolts commonly experienced in city bus travel’… . Moreover, a plaintiff may not satisfy that burden of proof merely by characterizing the stop as unusual and violent … . There must be ‘objective evidence of the force of the stop sufficient to establish an inference that the stop was extraordinary and violent, of a different class than the jerks and jolts commonly experienced in city bus travel and, therefore, attributable to the negligence of defendant’ … . In seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint, … common carriers have the burden of establishing, prima facie, that the stop was not unusual and violent … .  Alandette v New York City Tr. Auth., 2015 NY Slip Op 03113, 2nd Dept 4-15-15

 

You might also like
Neither Plaintiff Nor Intervenor Bank Had Standing to Determine Validity of Mortgage
Criteria for Arbitrability of Dispute Involving Public Employees Succinctly Explained
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER STOCKING SHELVES WAS PART OF A LARGER RENOVATION PROJECT AND THEREFORE A COVERED ACTIVITY UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) (SECOND DEPT).
IN THESE MARITIME LAW ACTIONS STEMMING FROM A FATAL BOATING ACCIDENT, THE TOWN DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ITS ENTITLEMENT TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE COMPLAINTS ALLEGED NEGLIGENT PLACEMENT OF BUOYS (SECOND DEPT).
OFFICER DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE VAN AFTER HE LEARNED THAT DEFENDANT, WHO WAS SITTING IN THE PASSENGER SEAT, WAS SMOKING A CIGAR, NOT MARIJUANA, SUPREME COURT’S SUA SPONTE FINDING THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST THE SEARCH WAS ERROR, THERE WAS UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE THE VAN WAS DEFENDANT’S WORK VEHICLE (SECOND DEPT).
STUDENT ASSUMED THE RISK OF INJURY DURING LACROSSE PRACTICE.
PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF RPAPL 1304 AND THEREFORE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION; DEFENDANT’S MERE DENIAL OF RECEIPT OF THE NOTICE DID NOT WARRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN DEFENDANT’S FAVOR (SECOND DEPT).
THE IMPOUNDMENT AND SEARCH OF DEFENDANT’S CAR, WHICH WAS LEGALLY PARKED AT THE TIME OF DEFENDANT’S ARREST, WERE ILLEGAL; THE SEIZED EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Although the Doctor Was Employed by the Hospital, His Employment Did Not Encompass... Insurer Not Estopped from Disclaiming Coverage Four Years After the Claim—No...