New York Appellate Digest
  • Home
  • About
  • Just Released
  • Update Service
  • Streamlined Research
  • CLE Courses
  • Contact
  • Menu Menu
You are here: Home1 / Criminal Law2 / PURUSANT TO CPL 420.25, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY DECLARED A DEED WHICH WAS...
Criminal Law, Real Property Law

PURUSANT TO CPL 420.25, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY DECLARED A DEED WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT OF AN OFFERING-A-FALSE-INSTRUMENT-FOR-FILING CONVICTION VOID AB INITIO; THE ARGUMENT THE PEOPLE MUST PROVE THE SIGNATURES ON THE DEED ARE FORGED WAS REJECTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Quirk, determined the Criminal Procedure Law allows the court to declare a deed void ab initio where a deed is the subject of a offering-a-false-instrument-for-filing conviction. The argument the People were required to prove the signatures on the deed were forged was rejected:

This appeal presents issues with respect to CPL 420.45, a statute enacted in 2019 that permits a court, upon motion and after a hearing, to order that an instrument affecting real property be declared void ab initio when, as relevant here, a defendant has been convicted of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree and the instrument is material to the encumbrance, transfer, or purchase of real property. Nonparty Bil-Man Asset Management, LLC (hereinafter the appellant), contends that CPL 420.45 applies only to deeds containing forged signatures and that the People failed to establish that the deed at issue here was forged. The appellant further contends that it rebutted the presumption under CPL 420.45 that the deed at issue was void ab initio. … Supreme Court properly granted the People’s motion, in effect, pursuant to CPL 420.45 to declare the deed void ab initio. * * *

Each guilty plea arose out of a scheme by the defendant and the codefendant to defraud the defendant’s mother, Marta Merino, out of certain real property that she owned in Brooklyn (hereinafter the property). Specifically, the defendant admitted … she recorded a deed (hereinafter the fraudulent deed) with the Office of the City Register of New York that purported to transfer title to the property from her mother to herself. She also admitted … she recorded a second deed, transferring title to the property from herself to 523 73rd Street, LLC, of which she was a member, and that there was never any agreement between the defendant and her mother that the defendant would hold title to the property. The defendant and the codefendant admitted that they stole loan proceeds from the appellant by means of a fraudulent mortgage on the property. * * *

… [T]he plain language of CPL 420.45 does not limit its application to deeds containing forged signatures. People v Merino, 2026 NY Slip Op 05196, Second Dept 9-2-26

Practice Point: Consult this opinion for an in-depth discussion of when a real-property-related instrument which is the subject of an offering-a-false-instrument-for-filing conviction can be declared void ab initio by the court. The People need not prove the signatures on the instrument are forged.

 

September 2, 2026
Tags: Second Department
Share this entry
  • Share on WhatsApp
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2026-09-02 12:16:422026-09-11 13:08:13PURUSANT TO CPL 420.25, SUPREME COURT PROPERLY DECLARED A DEED WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT OF AN OFFERING-A-FALSE-INSTRUMENT-FOR-FILING CONVICTION VOID AB INITIO; THE ARGUMENT THE PEOPLE MUST PROVE THE SIGNATURES ON THE DEED ARE FORGED WAS REJECTED (SECOND DEPT).
You might also like
THE CUSTODY/GUARDIANSHIP HEARING TOOK SEVEN YEARS AND THE CHILDREN RESIDED WITH GRANDMOTHER AND UNCLE DURING THAT TIME; THE EXTENDED DISRUPTION OF CUSTODY CAUSED BY THE PROTRACTED COURT PROCEEDINGS DID NOT CONSTITUTE “EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES” WARRANTING AN AWARD OF CUSTODY TO GRANDMOTHER AND UNCLE (SECOND DEPT). ​
FAMILY COURT SHOULD HAVE APPOINTED MOTHER GUARDIAN OF THE JUVENILE, DISPENSED WITH SERVICE ON FATHER, AND MADE FINDINGS TO ALLOW THE JUVENILE TO APPLY FOR SPECIAL JUVENILE IMMIGRATION STATUS (SJIS); ALL OF THE COMPLICATED, INTERTWINED STATUTORY LAW EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE BUS STOPPED IN AN UNUSUAL AND VIOLENT WAY IN THIS COMMON CARRIER INJURY CASE (SECOND DEPT).
Plaintiff Could Not Rely On Code Provisions Not Mentioned in Plaintiff’s Bill of Particulars to Defeat Summary Judgment
Application to File Late Notice of Claim Against School District Properly Denied—School District Did Not Have Timely Actual Notice and Plaintiff Had No Reasonable Excuse
A JUDGE HAS DISCRETION TO DENY A MOTION FOR A DEFAULT JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND THE CAUSE OF ACTION HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO BE VIABLE; HERE THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT, WHICH ARE DEEMED ADMITTED, STATED A VIABLE CAUSE OF ACTION AND THE MOTION FOR A DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
THE COMPLAINT AGAINST THE LESSOR OF THE CAR INVOLVED IN THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED PURSUANT TO THE GRAVES AMENDMENT; DEFENDANT LESSOR DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE ALLEGATION THE CAR WAS NEGLIGENTLY MAINTAINED WAS “NOT A FACT AT ALL” (SECOND DEPT). ​
DEFENDANT ALLOWED PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT, 18, TO DRIVE HIS LAMBORGHINI WHILE DEFENDANT WAS A PASSENGER; PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT LOST CONTROL AT 180 MPH, STRUCK A GUARD RAIL, WAS EJECTED AND DIED FROM HIS INJURIES; THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT, RAISED BY PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT, WHETHER DEFENDANT HAD SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE WHICH RENDERED PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S USE OF THE CAR UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS; THE NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
0 replies

Leave a Reply

Want to join the discussion?
Feel free to contribute!

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Categories

  • Abuse of Process
  • Account Stated
  • Accountant Malpractice
  • Administrative Law
  • Agency
  • Animal Law
  • Appeals
  • Arbitration
  • Architectural Malpractice
  • Associations
  • Attorneys
  • Banking Law
  • Bankruptcy
  • Battery
  • Chiropractor Malpractice
  • Civil Commitment
  • Civil Conspiracy
  • Civil Forfeiture
  • Civil Procedure
  • Civil Rights Law
  • Condominium Corporations
  • Condominiums
  • Constitutional Law
  • Consumer Law
  • Contempt
  • Contract Law
  • Conversion
  • Cooperatives
  • Copyright
  • Corporation Law
  • Correction Law
  • County Law
  • Court of Claims
  • Criminal Law
  • Debtor-Creditor
  • Defamation
  • Dental Malpractice
  • Disciplinary Hearings (Inmates)
  • Education-School Law
  • Election Law
  • Eminent Domain
  • Employment Law
  • Engineering Malpractice
  • Environmental Law
  • Equitable Recoupment
  • Evidence
  • Fair Credit Reporting Act
  • Fair Housing Act
  • Fair Housing Amendments Act
  • False Arrest
  • False Claims Act
  • False Imprisonment
  • Family Law
  • Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
  • Fiduciary Duty
  • Forcible Touching
  • Foreclosure
  • Fraud
  • Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)
  • Human Rights Law
  • Immigration Law
  • Immunity
  • Indian Law
  • Insurance Law
  • Intellectual Property
  • Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Involuntary Medical Treatment and Feeding (Inmates)
  • Judges
  • Judiciary Law
  • Labor Law
  • Labor Law-Construction Law
  • Land Use
  • Landlord-Tenant
  • Legal Malpractice
  • Lien Law
  • Limited Liability Company Law
  • Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act
  • Malicious Prosecution
  • Maritime Law
  • Medicaid
  • Medical Malpractice
  • Mental Hygiene Law
  • Military Law
  • Money Had and Received
  • Municipal Law
  • Navigation Law
  • Negligence
  • Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Negligent Misrepresentation
  • Notarial Misconduct
  • Nuisance
  • Partnership Law
  • Personal Property
  • Pharmacist Malpractice
  • Physician Patient Confidentiality
  • Pistol Permits
  • Prima Facie Tort
  • Private Nuisance
  • Privilege
  • Products Liability
  • Professional Malpractice
  • Public Authorities Law
  • Public Corporations
  • Public Health Law
  • Public Nuisance
  • Real Estate
  • Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)
  • Real Property Law
  • Real Property Tax Law
  • Religion
  • Replevin
  • Retirement and Social Security Law
  • Securities
  • Sepulcher
  • Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)
  • Social Services Law
  • Statutes
  • Tax Law
  • Tenant Harassment
  • Tortious Interference with Contract
  • Tortious Interference with Employment
  • Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations
  • Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage
  • Town Law
  • Toxic Torts
  • Trade Secrets
  • Trademarks
  • Trespass
  • Trespass to Chattels
  • Trusts and Estates
  • Uncategorized
  • Unemployment Insurance
  • Unfair Competition
  • Uniform Commercial Code
  • Usury
  • Utilities
  • Vehicle and Traffic Law
  • Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law (VGM)
  • Village Law
  • Water Law
  • Workers' Compensation
  • Zoning

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PURSUANT TO CPL 30.30(2)(A), THE 90-DAY SPEEDY TRIAL CLOCK DOES NOT COUNT DAYS... HERE IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, PLAINTIFF FILED A REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION...
Scroll to top