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HERE IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION, PLAINTIFF FILED A REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION SEEKING A SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE WITHIN ONE YEAR OF DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT; THEREFORE PLAINTIFF NEED NOT PROVIDE A REASONABLE EXCUSE FOR THE DELAY OR DEMONSTRATE A MERITORIOUS CAUSE OF ACTION TO AVOID DISMISSAL FOR ABANDONMENT PURSUANT TO CPLR 3215(C); ANY FURTHER DELAYS AFTER THE REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL INTERVENTION ARE IRRELEVANT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court’s sua sponte dismissal of the complaint in this foreclosure action, determined plaintiff did not abandon the action because it filed a request for judicial intervention seeking a settlement conference within one year of defendant’s default:

Pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), “[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned . . . unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed.” “To avoid dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), it is not necessary for a plaintiff to actually obtain a default judgment within one year of the default. Rather, as long as ‘proceedings’ are being taken, and these proceedings manifest an intent not to abandon the case but to seek a judgment, the case should not be subject to dismissal” … . The filing of a request for judicial intervention that seeks a residential mortgage foreclosure settlement conference as mandated by CPLR 3408 constitutes the taking of proceedings under CPLR 3215(c) … . * * *

Since the plaintiff demonstrated that it initiated proceedings for the entry of a judgment of foreclosure and sale within one year after [the] default, it was not required to proffer a reasonable excuse or demonstrate a potentially meritorious cause of action … . Furthermore, “once the plaintiff established that it had initiated proceedings for the entry of a judgment within one year after the defendants’ default, it was in compliance with CPLR 3215(c) and it was not required, under the plain language of that subdivision, to account for any additional periods of delay that may have occurred subsequent to the initial one-year period contemplated by CPLR 3215(c)” … . Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Miller, 2026 NY Slip Op 05153, Second Dept 9-2-26

Practice Point: If, in a foreclosure action, plaintiff files a request for judicial intervention and a settlement conference within one year of defendant’s default, plaintiff need not provide an excuse for the delay or demonstrate a meritorious cause of action to avoid dismissal of the complaint as abandoned pursuant to CPLR 3215(c). Once proceedings have been taken within one year of default, any further delays after the taking of proceedings are irrelevant to any claim of abandonment.

 

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