THE FAILURE TO GIVE THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE JURY INSTRUCTION WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR HERE, BUT WAS HARMLESS ERROR IN THE CODEFENDANT’S APPEAL (FOURTH DEPT).
The Fourth Department, reversing defendant’s conviction and ordering a new trial, determined the defense request for a circumstantial evidence jury instruction should have been granted. Defendant and his uncle were charged with murder, robbery and criminal possession of a weapon. The uncle was convicted and the Fourth Department ruled that the failure to give the circumstantial evidence jury instruction was harmless error. However the evidence against defendant was weaker and the jury charge may well have led to an acquittal:
… [W]e agree with defendant that the court erred in denying the request for a circumstantial evidence charge … . As we noted in the codefendant’s appeal, “[a]lthough surveillance video footage of a crime can constitute direct evidence . . . , it did not constitute direct evidence here. Defendant’s identity cannot be discerned clearly from the surveillance video footage offered at trial inasmuch as the perpetrators in the videos are masked” … .
We concluded in the codefendant’s appeal that the court’s failure to give the circumstantial evidence charge was harmless given that the codefendant and his vehicle could be tracked to the scenes of the offenses based upon cell phone data, license plate readers, and surveillance video (McEnnis, 247 AD3d at 1475-1476). Here, however, the evidence of defendant’s involvement was substantially less. While one perpetrator on the surveillance video generally matched defendant’s height and build, no witness identified him at the scene of any of the robberies. Moreover, as the People’s expert acknowledged, the expert had “no location information” for defendant’s phone at the times that the alleged incidents occurred. Although the evidence at trial established that defendant exchanged text messages and calls with the codefendant on the dates of the offenses and that the codefendant drove to defendant’s apartment building in Niagara Falls prior to and after the offenses, the People’s expert conceded that he could do little more than “speculate [as to] where [defendant] was during [those] periods of time” when the robberies were being committed. Thus, this is not “the exceptional case where the failure to give the circumstantial evidence charge was harmless error” … . People v Coleman, 2026 NY Slip Op 04629. Fourth Dept 7-24-26
Practice Point: Defendant and his uncle were charged with murder and robbery and tried separately. The failure to give the circumstantial evidence jury instruction was harmless error in the uncle’s trial. But it was reversible error in defendant’s trial because the evidence tying defendant to the crimes was weaker.

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