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FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO CONDUCT A “BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD” HEARING WHERE THE AUTHORIZED ADOPTION AGENCY WITHDREW ITS CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION; THE SECOND DEPARTMENT ASKED THE LEGISLATURE TO ADDRESS THIS STATUTORY PROBLEM (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Wooten, was constrained to find that the court did not have jurisdiction to conduct a “best interests of the child” hearing where the authorized adoption agency withdrew its consent to the adoption. The Second Department explained that the current statutory scheme places an authorized adoption agency in the role typically performed by Family Court and requested that the Legislature address the problem:

The primary issue presented by this appeal is whether a court reviewing an adoption proceeding has jurisdiction to entertain a hearing to determine the best interests of a child where an authorized agency with custody of the child has withdrawn or withheld its consent to the adoption petition. We are constrained by the statutory scheme for adoptions from an authorized agency to answer that question in the negative. However, the circumstances underlying this proceeding highlight the potential conflict between the governing statutory law and the paramount concerns of the best interests of the child and achieving permanency. We therefore take this occasion to ask the New York State Legislature to consider whether changes are needed to ensure the best interests of children placed in the custody of authorized agencies for the purpose of adoption. * * *

… [B]efore a best interests hearing was conducted, the proposed adoptive father withdrew the adoption petition insofar as asserted by him on the ground that he was no longer seeking to jointly adopt the child with the appellant. The proposed adoptive father’s withdrawal of the joint adoption petition insofar as asserted by him was precipitated by the biological parents’ decision to support adoption of the child by the proposed adoptive father alone.

,,, [T]he agency withdrew its consent to the joint adoption of the child by the proposed adoptive parents on the ground that the proposed adoptive father “is no longer petitioning the Court to adopt jointly with [the appellant].” The agency then moved to dismiss the adoption petition on the ground that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the adoption petition due to the agency’s withdrawal of its consent to the joint adoption. In support of the motion, the agency argued that dismissal of the adoption petition was mandated, without a best interests hearing, since the agency had lawful custody of the child and, therefore, its consent to the adoption was required pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 111. Matter of Aurora A. (Leigh A.–Giuseppe A.), 2026 NY Slip Op 04500, Second Dept 7-22-26

 

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