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HERE IN THIS SIDEWALK SLIP AND FALL CASE THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE PROPERTY ADJACENT TO THE UNEVEN SIDEWALK WAS “OWNER OCCUPIED” SUCH THAT THE NYC ADMINISTRATIVE CODE EXCEPTION TO THE SIDEWALK-MAINTENANCE OBLIGATION APPLIED; CRITERIA EXPLAINED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this sidewalk slip and fall case should not have been granted. The NYC Administrative Code creates an exception to the sidewalk-maintenance requirement for “owner occupied” properties. That term is undefined. Here the defendants did not submit sufficient proof that the “owner-occupied” exception applied:

“‘Section 7-210 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York unambiguously imposes a nondelegable duty on certain real property owners to maintain city sidewalks abutting their land in a reasonably safe condition'” … . “However, this liability-shifting provision does not apply to ‘one-, two- or three-family residential real property that is (i) in whole or in part, owner occupied, and (ii) used exclusively for residential purposes'” … . “The statute does not expressly contain a primary residence requirement as part of the owner-occupied exemption, but the term ‘owner occupied’ generally is used to mean that the owner regularly occupies the property as a residence” … . Although “owner occupied” is not defined in the statute, it is clearly a lower standard than that of a primary residence. Furthermore, “[t]he purpose of the exception in the Code is to recognize the inappropriateness of exposing small-property owners in residence, who have limited resources, to exclusive liability with respect to sidewalk maintenance and repair” … .

The Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. The defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that they were entitled to the exemption from liability under Administrative Code § 7-210(b). Although the defendants submitted proof that they are the owners of the subject property, which is a one-family home, they failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether the property was “owner occupied” within the meaning of the statute … . Mantinaos v City of New York, 2026 NY Slip Op 03957, Second Dept 6-24-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the meaning of “owner occupied” in the NYC Administrative Code such that the sidewalk-maintenance obligation does not apply.

 

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HERE THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY BROUGHT A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION TO PROHIBIT... DEFENDANT WAS OBSERVED WALKING UP AND DOWN DRIVEWAYS IN A RESIDENTIAL NEIGHBORHOOD;...