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A CONTRACT WHICH ALLOWS A PARTY “SOLE DISCRETION” TO ASSIGN A LOAN IS CONSTRAINED BY THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING; HERE IT WAS ALLEGED THE ASSIGNMENT WAS PART OF A “BACKROOM DEAL” TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF FROM A DEVELOPMENT PROJECT AND BENEFIT FROM A RESULTING WINDFALL; THE BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT CAUSE OF ACTION WAS REINSTATED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Wilson, over a three-judge partial dissent, reversing (modifying) thee Appellate Division, determined the cause of action alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should not have been dismissed. The complex facts of the case center around loans and contracts to develop a luxury residential tower. Under the Pledge Agreement at issue the defendant, Apollo, had “sole discretion” to assign a “junior mezzanine loan.” The majority concluded that the “sole discretion” did not override the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff alleged the assignment of the loan to “Spruce” was part of a “backroom deal” to push plaintiff out of the project’s capital structure and benefit from a resulting windfall:

We concur with the prevailing view among the Appellate Division departments—that a party’s “sole discretion” with respect to a right does not exculpate that party from complying with the implied covenant with respect to that right. Although “parties to a contract are basically free to make whatever agreement they wish, no matter how unwise it might appear to a third party . . . [t]here exists an unavoidable tension between the concept of freedom to contract . . . and the equally fundamental belief that an enlightened society must to some extent protect its members from the potentially harsh effects of an unchecked free market system” … . In light of those competing interests, “rightly or wrongly, society has chosen to intervene in various ways in the dealings between private parties,” for example by “mandating the express or implicit inclusion of certain substantive or procedural provisions in various types of contracts” … . Indeed, one of those implicit substantive provisions is the implied covenant, which has the primary purpose of ensuring that “neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract,” when that conduct is “inconsistent with the other terms of the contractual relationship,” and yet not negotiated for in advance … .

This doctrine is even more important “where a contract contemplates the exercise of discretion,” or in other words awards one party the freedom to act in ways the contract may not directly foresee … . Accordingly, the implied covenant obligates the party with discretion act in good faith, and “not [] arbitrarily or irrationally,” when “exercising that discretion” … . A promisor’s discretion may not be used to violate a promise that “a reasonable person in the position of the promisee would be justified in understanding w[as] included” … . 111 W. 57th Inv. LLC v 111 W57 Mezz Inv. LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 03376, CtApp 5-28-26

Practice Point: A contract provision allowing a party “sole discretion” to take certain actions is constrained by the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. i.e., a party cannot exercise discretion in a way that frustrates another party’s rights under the contract.

 

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