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OVERRULING A 2006 OPINION, A PLAINTIFF IN A DOG-BITE ACTION CAN NOW SUE IN STRICT LIABILITY AND COMMON-LAW NEGLIGENCE (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the appellate division in this dog-bite case, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, reinstating the strict liability and common-law negligence causes of action, overruled the 2006 Court of Appeals case holding that there is no common-law liability for injury caused by a domestic animal:

Plaintiff Rebecca Flanders, a postal carrier, was bitten by a dog owned by Defendants Stephen and Michelle Goodfellow while delivering a package to their residence. She commenced this action to recover damages for her injuries, asserting causes of action sounding in strict liability and negligence. Both causes of action were dismissed, and Flanders asks us to reinstate them.

Under settled law, an owner of a domestic animal who has actual or constructive knowledge of their animal’s vicious propensities will be held strictly liable for harm caused as a result of those propensities. There is a triable issue of fact as to whether the Goodfellows had constructive knowledge of their dog’s vicious propensities, and so summary judgment should not have been granted to them on the strict liability cause of action.

The lower courts dismissed Flanders’s negligence cause of action as barred by Bard v Jahnke (6 NY3d 592 [2006]), which held that there can be no common-law negligence liability when a domestic animal causes harm. Experience has shown that this rule is in tension with ordinary tort principles, unworkable, and, in some circumstances, unfair. Continued adherence to Bard therefore would not achieve the stability, predictability, and uniformity in the application of the law that the doctrine of stare decisis seeks to promote. Accordingly, we overrule Bard to the extent that it bars negligence liability for harm caused by domestic animals, and reinstate Flanders’s negligence cause of action. * * *

Our decision today means that there is a two-pronged approach to liability for harms caused by animals … .. A plaintiff who suffers an animal-induced injury therefore has a choice. If the owner knew or should have known the animal had vicious propensities, the plaintiff may seek to hold them strictly liable. Or they can rely on rules of ordinary negligence and seek to prove that the defendant failed to exercise due care under the circumstances that caused their injury. Of course, a plaintiff might also assert both theories of liability … .  Flanders v Goodfellow, 2025 NY Slip Op 02261, CtApp 4-17-25

Practice Point: A plaintiff in a dog-bite case can now assert both strict liability and common-law negligence causes of action.

 

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