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SUPREME COURT’S GRANTING OF DEFENDANTS’ SUPPRESSION MOTIONS REVERSED IN THIS TRAFFIC STOP CASE; THE REPORT THAT THE VEHICLE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN AN ARMED ROBBERY THAT DAY AND THE DEFENDANTS’ LACK OF COOPERATION AT THE TIME OF THE STOP JUSTIFIED BREAKING THE VEHICLE’S WINDOWS, REMOVING THE DEFENDANTS AND HANDCUFFING THEM; OBSERVING A FIREARM IN THE VEHICLE PROVIDED PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court’s suppression of evidence seized during a traffic stop, over a dissent, determined the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and exigent circumstances justified the search of a defendant’s fanny pack. The dissent disagreed about the legitimacy of the search of the fanny pack:

… [T]he police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle based upon the fact that the description of the vehicle matched that of a vehicle that had been involved in an armed robbery earlier that day, and the vehicle’s location had been detected by a license plate reader approximately five minutes prior to the stop … . Moreover, the actions of the police officers in drawing their guns and ordering the defendants out of the vehicle were justified under the circumstances as appropriate measures to ensure their safety … . Additionally, when the defendants failed to cooperate with the officers’ instructions, the officers acted appropriately in breaking the vehicle’s “excessive[ly] . . . tint[ed]” front windows for their own safety and then in removing the defendants from the vehicle and placing them in handcuffs … . The police thereafter had probable cause to arrest the defendants once the officer observed a firearm in plain view in the compartment of the driver’s side door of the vehicle … .

… [T]he subsequent search of Rivera’s fanny pack was justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest … . * * *

“Under the State Constitution, to justify a warrantless search incident to arrest, the People must satisfy two separate requirements” … . “The first imposes spatial and temporal limitations to ensure that the search is ‘not significantly divorced in time or place from the arrest'” … . “The second, and equally important, predicate requires the People to demonstrate the presence of exigent circumstances” … . …

… The police were notified that a vehicle matching the description of the subject vehicle was involved earlier the same day in a gunpoint robbery in Brooklyn. … [A]fter the vehicle was boxed in by police vehicles, the occupants tried to escape the scene in the vehicle and continually refused the officer’s directives to lower the heavily tinted car windows or exit the vehicle. People v David, 2026 NY Slip Op 01980, Second Dept 4-1-26

Practice Point: Here Supreme Court granted defendants’ suppression motions and the Appellate Division reversed finding (1) the guns-drawn traffic stop, (2) the breaking of the vehicle’s windows, (3) the removal of defendants from the vehicle, (4) the handcuffing of the defendants, and (5) the arrest of the defendants upon observing a firearm in the vehicle, were constitutionally justified.

 

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