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THE SECOND DEPARTMENT REVERSED SUPREME COURT AND FOUND THERE WAS “GOOD CAUSE” FOR THE 27-YEAR DELAY BETWEEN THE HOMICIDE AND DEFENDANT’S ARREST FOR MURDER (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, in a detailed full-fledged opinion by Justice Wan, determined defendant’s due process rights were not violated by a 27-year delay between the homicide and defendant’s arrest for murder. The opinion is necessarily fact-specific. The facts were analyzed using the “Taranovich factors” for determining whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial or due process right to prompt prosecution has been violated. The facts are too complex to fairly summarize here:

“The Court of Appeals has articulated the following factors to consider when determining whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial or due process right to prompt prosecution has been violated: (1) the extent of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the nature of the underlying charge, (4) whether there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration, and (5) whether there is any indication that the defense has been prejudiced by the delay” (hereinafter the Taranovich factors) (… see People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445). “The Taranovich framework is a holistic one” … . Thus, “[n]o one factor or combination of the factors is necessarily decisive or determinative of the prompt prosecution claim, but rather the particular case must be considered in light of all the factors as they apply to it” … . “Where, as here, there has been a protracted preindictment delay over a period of years, the burden is on the prosecution to establish good cause” … . People v Grant, 2026 NY Slip Op 00910, Second Dept 2-18-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into how the “Taranovich factors” are applied to the facts to determine whether there is “good cause” for an extensive delay in prosecution, here 27 years.

 

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